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INTRODUCTION

Congress designed Chapter 13 to allow individuals an extended period of time to pay their debts so that they may support themselves and
their dependents while repaying their creditors." Chapter 13 bankruptcy is more favorable to debtors than a straight liquidation under
Chapter 7 because Chapter 13 debtors may keep all of their assets while
Chapter 7 debtors must surrender most of their assets to generate funds
with which to pay their creditors.2 A Chapter 13 debtor also benefits by
avoiding the stigma and less favorable credit rating that accompanies a
liquidating bankruptcy.s Chapter 13's benefit to creditors is also selfevident: their losses will be significantly less than if their debtors opt
4
for straight bankruptcy.

An emerging trend to interpret the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") 5
as prohibiting cramdown of residential mortgages threatens Chapter
13's mission.' The term "cramdown" refers generally to any attempt by
a debtor to pay a secured creditor less than the full amount of its
claim.7 For example, suppose a debtor previously borrowed $100,000 to
purchase a home valued at $150,000. Assume further that the fair market value of that home falls to $60,000 while the amount of the debt
remains $100,000.8 The creditor now lacks security for the full amount
of his loan. Cramdown allows the debtor to discharge the debt and retain the collateral by paying only the fair market value of the collateral
1. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 118 (1977), in 3 USCCAN 5963, 6079.
2. Id. Section 522 allows an individual debtor to retain a limited amount of assets (exempt
from property of the estate). 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
3. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-595 at 118, in 3 USCCAN at 6079 (cited in note 1).
4. Id.
5. All references to code sections or the "Code" are to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as
amended and codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330 (1988).
6. Debtors that cram down creditors' claims to the current value of the collateral securing
the claim effectively undermine, by paying the Chapter 13 creditor no more than it would receive
under a Chapter 7 liquidation, those aspects of Chapter 13 that are designed to provide creditors
with recoveries on their debts greater than under Chapter 7.
7. Cramdown is, therefore, a broad term. Sections 506(a) and 1322(b)(2) of the Code allow a
debtor to cramdown most undersecured claims by bifurcating the claim into two claims: one claim
equal to the current value of the collateral and a second claim equal to the difference between the
full claim and the current value of the collateral. The focus of this Note is whether an exception
contained in Section 1322(b)(2) prevents such a cramdown of a claim secured only by the debtor's
principal residence.
This Note does not address cramdown pursuant to Section 1325(b)(1), which allows a court to
confirm a debtor's plan of reorganization over the objection of a creditor if the plan meets certain
requirements.
8. Notice that the creditor is now "undersecured." Collateral worth only $60,000 secures the
creditor's loan of $100,000, so the creditor lacks security for $40,000 of the loan. Generally, Section
506(a) would bifurcate the claim of $100,000 into a secured claim of $60,000 and an unsecured
claim of $40,000.
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plus a fraction9 of the difference between the amount of the debt and
the value of the collateral. In our example, the debtor may keep his
home, free of any liens or encumbrances, by paying $60,000 plus a fraction, perhaps as little as ten percent,10 of $40,000. Thus, the debtor
might discharge a debt of $100,000, secured by a home that was once
worth $150,000, by paying the creditor as little as $64,000.
Cramdown's value to debtors lies in the fact that they do not have
to pay their debts in full, but instead may treat the liens on their homes
as unsecured claims to the extent that the liens exceed the value of the
collateral." Chapter 13 requires debtors to pay unsecured creditors only
what they would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation case. 1 2 This
may be nothing at all, and is often as little as five or ten cents on the

dollar.'3
Whether the Code permits cramdown of residential mortgages
under Chapter 13 is an important question. Debtors choose to file under
Chapter 13 principally to keep their homes.' 4 If cramdown is found unavailable then debtors may be less likely to choose Chapter 13 rather
than Chapter 7 with the ultimate result that Chapter 13's mission is left
unaccomplished.
Despite the importance of the cramdown question, the issue remains unresolved.'" Advocates of cramdown believe that cramdown is
consistent with the basic structure and mechanics of Section 506(a), a
9. The fraction a Chapter 13 debtor must pay is the amount the creditor would have received under a Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988). Generally speaking, under
Chapter 7 a trustee collects a debtor's property, sells it, then pays the debtor's debts. Id. § 704;
David G. Epstein, Jonathan M. Landers, and Steve H. Nickles, Debtors and Creditors 707-09
(West, 3d ed. 1987). Unsecurid creditors receive a pro rata share; that is, a share proportionate to
their claim, of what is left of the debtor's property after secured creditors and priority expenses are
paid in full. 11 U.S.C. § 726; Epstein, Landers, and Nickles, Debtors and Creditors at 709.
10. This fraction varies from case to case. It is determined by dividing what is left of the
debtor's estate after paying secured claims and priorities in full by the aggregate amount of unsecured claims.
11. See In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483, 486 n.5 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654
(1992).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988).
13. Unsecured creditors may receive as little as five or ten cents on the dollar in a Chapter 7
case because Section 726(b) allows pro rata payment to similarly situated claims if all similarly
situated claims cannot be paid in full. See also Chaim J. Fortgang and Thomas Moers Mayer,
Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1061, 1065 n.16 (1985) (citing an empirical study in
which unsecured creditors received an average of three cents on the dollar).
14. Regina L. Nassen, Bankruptcy Code § 1322(b)(2)'s No-Modification Clause: Who Does
It Protect?, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 979, 979 n.1 (1991).
15. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in In re Nobleman. 113 S. Ct. 654.
The Court's decision in Nobleman should provide a judicial answer to the question. The issue,
however, may be the subject of congressional action even after the Supreme Court rules in Nobleman because cramdown or its prohibition significantly affects debtors, creditors, and borrowers in
general.
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section critical to the application of much of the Code.16 Advocates of

cramdown also contend that the plain language of the Code does not
prohibit cramdown, while opponents of cramdown point to Section
1322(b)(2) as authority for the proposition that the Code does prohibit
cramdown of mortgages that are secured only by the debtor's principal
residence.17
Prior to Dewsnup v. Timm,' 8 a majority of courts found that the
Code permitted cramdown of residential mortgages. Indeed, the Third,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all expressly adopted this view.19 While no
circuit court opinion prior to Dewsnup held that the Code prohibited
cramdown, a number of lower courts took this position.20 After the Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup, which held that the Code prohibited the closely related practice of stripdown 21 in Chapter 7 cases, an
increasing number of courts have begun to prohibit cramdown of residential mortgages under Chapter 13.22

Part II of this Note examines the cramdown debate prior to Dewsnup. Part III traces the Supreme Court's reasoning in Dewsnup and
its impact on the cramdown question. Part IV begins by critiquing ex16. Section 506 provides:
Determination of Secured Status
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to
the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less
than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose
of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
17. See text accompanying notes 55-96 for a discussion of arguments against cramdown. Section 1322(a) lists what a debtor's plan of reorganization must do, while Section 1322(b) lists what
the plan may do. Section 1322(b)(2) provides that the plan may modify the rights of holders of
secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of
holders of any class of claims.
18. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
19. See In re Houghland, 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage
Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3rd Cir. 1990); In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
20. See, for example, In re Schum, 112 Bankr. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Sauber,
115 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Mitchell, 125 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); In re
Catlin, 81 Bankr. 522 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703 (D.N.D. 1988); In re
Lee, 137 Bankr. 285 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991); In re Etchin, 128 Bankr. 662 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1991); In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. 733 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. 200
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
21. Stripdown refers to liens while cramdown refers to claims. A debtor "strips down" a lien
by avoiding, pursuant to Section 506(d), that portion of the lien not supported by value. A debtor
crams down a claim held by a creditor by paying (in full satisfaction of the claim) less than the full
amount of the claim. This is often accomplished by bifurcating the claim under Section 506(a), but
may also be accomplished under Section 1325(b)(1).
22. See text accompanying notes 116-62.
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isting interpretations of Section 1322(b)(2) and the cramdown debate.
It then discusses the bankruptcy values implicated in the debate and
analyzes the effect that valuation and misvaluation of collateral have on
the issue. Part IV proposes an original solution, awarding appreciation
in the value of the collateral during bankruptcy to the creditor. This
solution largely satisfies the misvaluation concerns, respects stare decisis and the Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup, and effectuates the
congressional intent behind Section 1322(b)(2).
II.

THE CRAMDOWN DEBATE PRIOR TO

A.

DEWSNUP

The Argument Supporting Cramdown

At least since the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Houghland,5
courts addressing the issue of whether the Code permits cramdown of
residential mortgages have focused on the interplay between Sections
506(a)24 and 1322(b)(2). In contrast to Section 1322(a), which dictates
what a debtor's plan must do, Section 1322(b) lists what a debtor's plan
may do. Specifically, Section 1322(b)(2) permits a debtor's plan to
"modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by... the debtor's principal residence, or [modify the rights
of holders] of unsecured claims." 2 5 Section 101, the definitional section
of the Code, defines "claim" 6 without reference to the value of any security. Section 506(a) then classifies claims as either secured or unsecured. Under Section 506(a), a claim is secured to the extent of the
value of any collateral securing it, while a claim is unsecured to the
extent the claim exceeds the value of any collateral securing it.
23. 886 F.2d at 1182. Prior to Houghland, a debtor's ability to cram down a residential mortgage was less clear. See, for example, In re Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428, 1442 (6th Cir. 1985) (assuming,
without extensive discussion, that Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits cramdown of residential mortgages); In re Catlin, 81 Bankr. at 524 (stating that "in a Chapter 13 case, the allowed amount of a
claim secured only by a security interest in the principal residence of a debtor is ... the balance
owing on the debt without regard to the value of the collateral-§ 506(a) notwithstanding"); In re
Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. at 200 (holding that Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits modification of even
undersecured claims secured by only the debtor's principal residence); In re Russell, 93 Bankr. at
703 (refusing to confirm a debtor's plan that proposed to pay claims secured only by the debtor's
principal residence less than the full balance owing at the time of filing).
24. For a discussion of Section 506(a), see text accompanying note 160.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
26. Section 101(5) defines "claim" as a
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured,
or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right
to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured;...
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In Houghland, the court began its analysis of whether the Code
allows cramdown by first bifurcating the lien on the debtor's principal
residence into a secured claim and an unsecured claim pursuant to Section 506(a).27 The court then considered whether the Code permits

modification of the claim's unsecured portion. 28 The court noted two

divergent lines of cases addressing this issue.2' First, some courts have
held that Section 1322(b)(2) does not affect a determination under Section 506(a) that a debtor may divide an undersecured claim into a secured and an unsecured portion. 0 Furthermore, these courts have held
that Section 1322 permits a debtor's plan to modify the unsecured portion of an unsecured claim." In contrast, other courts have held that
Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause3 2 prohibits modification of a
lender's rights and prevents separate treatment of what would otherwise be an unsecured claim.3 3 That is, Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than"
clause prevents debtors from using Section 506(a) to bifurcate a single,
undersecured claim into one fully secured claim and one undersecured
claim in order to treat the unsecured claim differently than the secured
claim.
The Houghland court chose to follow the first line of cases, and as
a matter of statutory construction 34 found specifically that Sections
506(a) and 1322(b)(2) do not conflict.3 5 The court also found that the
phrase "secured claim" means the same in Section 1322(b)(2) as it does
in Section 506(a). That is, the court used Section 506(a) to define a
secured claim as only that portion of a claim supported by value, rather
than the entire claim without respect to value. When the court used
27. In re Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1183. In Houghland, the secured claim was equal to the
value of the collateral at the time of filing. The unsecured claim was equal to the extent that the
balance owing on the lien exceeded the value of the collateral.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id., citing In re Harris,94 Bankr. 832 (D. N. J. 1989); In re Frost, 96 Bankr. 804 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Kehm, 90 Bankr. 117 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Caster, 77 Bankr. 8
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Bruce, 40 Bankr. 884 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984).
31. In re Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1183.
32. Section 1322(b)(2) allows a debtor's plan to modify the rights of holders of secured claims
other than claims secured only by the debtor's principal residence.
33. In re Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1183.
34. Id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)). The
Houghland court stated that "the quest for meaning should begin and end with the language of
the statute itself." Id. But see Patricia Lindauer, Optimizing the "Fresh Start": Mortgage
Cramdown Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 J. L. & Commerce 257, 264 (1992)
(arguing (i) that the court chose to allow cramdown because the loan at issue was a state benefit
that allowed negative amortization, (ii) that "real" lenders would not allow themselves to become
undersecured, since those who lend for profit do not make loans that allow negative amortization,
and (iii) that the Houghland court failed to anticipate other situations in which lenders could
become undersecured).
35. In re Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1183.
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Section 506(a) to define the words "secured claim," it assumed the permissibility of bifurcation rather than addressing it as an issue.36 Instead
of phrasing the issue as whether the "other than" clause prohibits bifurcation, the court focused on whether the "other than" clause protects the entire claim or only its secured portion after the claim has
been bifurcated.37 The court concluded that the "other than" clause
protects only the secured portion of the claim. The court then permitted the debtor's plan to modify the unsecured portion. 8
9 the Third
In Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corporation,"
Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion. It, too, began by finding that
Section 506(a) bifurcates undersecured mortgages. 40 The court began its
analysis by recognizing that Chapter 13 allows debtors to reorganize
their affairs in order to pay their debts through future earnings rather
than having to liquidate their assets as under Chapter 7.41 The court
then concluded that Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause protects
only the claim's secured portion.42 The court also specifically held that
Section 1322(b)(2) and Section 506(a) do not conflict 3 and that Section
1322(b)(2)'s specific exclusion does not control Section 506(a)'s general
provision.44 Further, the court refused to accept the argument that
cramdown left Section 1322(b)(2) without a purpose since, under the
court's interpretation, Section 1322(b)(2) still protects the secured portion of the claim.45
It was not until the Tenth Circuit's decision in In re Hart46 that a
court framed the issue as whether, pursuant to Section 506(a), a debtor
may bifurcate an undersecured lien, secured only by his or her principal
residence, into two claims such that the unsecured portion is left unprotected by Section 1322(b)(2)." Prior to Hart, most courts holding that
the Code permits cramdown began their analysis by bifurcating the
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1183-84. In fact, the court felt that this issue was dispositive. The court conceded
that if the "other than" clause refers to the entire secured claim, then the Code would prohibit
cramdown. Id. at 1184.
38. Id.
39. 895 F.2d 123.
40. Id. at 125 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 239
(1989)).
41. Id. Chapter 7 differs from Chapter 13 in that Chapter 7 requires debtors to liquidate
their assets in order to pay their debts, while Chapter 13 debtors usually pay their debts from their
future earnings. Compare Section 541 with Section 1306.
42. Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127.
43. Id. at 128.
44. Id. The court in In re Lewis had previously held Section 506(a) fully applicable to Chapter 13. 875 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1989).
45. Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128.
46. 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
47. Id. at 1411.
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claim without questioning whether Section 1322(b)(2) permits such a
bifurcation. The Hart court, however, did not evade the issue. Rather,
it began with a discussion of the legislative history of Section 1322(b)(2)
and concluded that Congress drafted the "other than" clause to protect
the lending industry. 48 The court found that cramdown, although not
entirely consistent with the legislative history,4 9 is consistent with the
plain meaning of Section 1322(b)(2). The court further found nothing
in Section 1322(b)(2) that authorizes courts to look beyond the Code to
define "secured claim. ' 50 The court conceded that although the result
was a modification of a secured claim-holder's rights, the modification
was not impermissible. 1
Houghland, Wilson, and Hart are significant because they interpret Sections 506(a) and 1322(b)(2) so as to avoid conflict between the
two Code provisions. By avoiding conflict, these courts escape resort to
the legislative history of Section 1322(b)(2), which clearly indicates an
intent to protect the home mortgage lending industry.52 Accordingly,
these courts never have to decide whether the limited protection their
interpretation of Section 1322(b)(2) provides mortgage lenders is consistent with Congress' intent. The strength of their approach, however,
is that it results in an interpretation of Section 1322(b)(2) that is harmonious 53 with Section 506 and is also consistent with the entire statutory scheme of Chapter 13.
B.

Arguments Against Cramdown

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup, courts holding
that the Code prohibits cramdown of residential mortgages under
48. Id. at 1412.
49. See text accompanying notes 176-82.
50. In re Hart, 923 F.2d at 1415. In doing so, the court relied on Section 506(a) to define the
words "secured claim" found in Section 1322(b)(2).
51. Id. The dissent emphasizied that the majority's interpretation of Section 1322(b)(2) rendered Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause essentially meaningless. Id. at 1417 (Brorby
dissenting).
52. What is not clear from the legislative history is to what extent Congress intended to
protect home mortgage lenders. See, for example, In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176, 181-82 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating that although Section 1322(b)(2) was designed to provide greater protection to home
mortgage lenders than to other secured creditors, the extent of this greater protection cannot be
determined from the legislative history).
53. The court in In re Bellamy endorsed the principle that, whenever possible, courts should
construe statutory provisions so as to avoid a conflict. 962 F.2d at 181 (citing Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 510 (1989); United States Say. Ass'n
of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'n, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (finding that statutory
construction is an holistic endeavor, and that apparently ambiguous language may be clarified
when viewed in context of a statutory scheme as a whole).
54. Peter H. Carrol III, Cramdown of Residential Mortgages in Chapter 13 Cases, 20 Colo.
Law 881, 882 (1991).

RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES

1993]

1039

Chapter 13 relied on at least six distinct rationales to support their
conclusions.
1.

Section 1322(b)(2) Supersedes Section 506(a)

As noted in the previous section, proponents of cramdown use Section 506(a) to bifurcate an undersecured claim in order to render the
claim's unsecured portion beyond the protection of Section
1322(b)(2).2 However, generally accepted tenets of statutory construction provide an argument that Section 1322(b)(2) alters Section 506(a)'s
bifurcation scheme. When two statutes conflict, one statute does not
apply or prevail over matters specifically dealt with in another part of
the same enactment, notwithstanding the apparent inclusiveness of the
statute's general language. 6 In other words, the specific protection that
Section 1322(b)(2) affords to home mortgagees should prevail over the
general language of Section 506(a). 7
A precondition to the validity of this argument is actual conflict
between Sections 1322(b)(2) and 506(a). 5s For example, the court in In
re Mitchell found conflict in that Section 506(a) invades the protection
of Section 1322(b)(2).2 Of course, courts that accept this argument always find the required conflict.6 0 Courts that allow bifurcation and
cramdown, however, typically speak of the virtue of reading Code provisions harmoniously or may even speak of the absence of conflict between Section 1322(b)(2) and Section 506(a).1' Curiously, these courts
that allow bifurcation and cramdown apply Section 506(a) in the same
manner as the Mitchell court, even though it determined the provisions
62
are in conflict.
Once a court decides that Section 506(a) conflicts with Section
1322(b)(2), the court must decide which section prevails. In In re
Sauber, the court chose Section 1322(b)(2) to prevail. In reaching this
decision, the court noted that the issue involved both general and spe55. See text accompanying notes 23-54.
56. In re Russell, 93 Bankr. at 705 (citing Maiatico v. United States, 302 F.2d 880, 886 (D.C.
Cir. 1962)).
57. See, for example, In re Lee, 137 Bankr. at 286; In re Etchin, 128 Bankr. at 665; In re
Mitchell, 125 Bankr. at 6; In re Sauber, 115 Bankr. at 199; In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. at 734-35; In
re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. at 202; In re Russell, 93 Bankr. at 705; In re Catlin, 81 Bankr. at 524.
58. In re Mitchell, 125 Bankr. at 6.
59. See note 43.
60. Id. Compare Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128.
61. See, for example, Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128, and text accompanying note 43.
62. See text accompanying note 43. Doubt is cast upon the supposed virtue of a harmonious
interpretation by the fact that some courts call the interpretation harmonious while other courts
call the same interpretation conflict. The real disagreement between these courts is not the proper
application of Section 506(a), but rather, the proper effect to be given to Section 1322(b)(2).
Courts that allow cramdown rarely address the issue in these terms.
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cific concepts intended to gbvern the rights of debtors and creditors in
varying situations and with different applications depending upon the
particular Code purpose to be served. 3 The court discounted Section
506(a)'s importance and almost universal application throughout the
rest of the Code by arguing that the application of concepts is not universal in the scheme of the Code, but rather is subject to limitation and
even total disregard in some instances. 4 The court.even went so far as
to criticize the Houghland court's analysis as "overly technocratic."65
2. Protection of Home Mortgage Lenders
Opponents of residential mortgage cramdown also argue that disallowance of cramdown is consistent with Section 1322(b)(2)'s goal of
protecting mortgage lenders."6 Many courts rely on Section 1322(b)(2)'s
legislative history to arrive at this conclusion. 7 Other courts have found
that this purpose is obvious from the statute's text.68
Some courts have focused on the issue of whether an examination
of Section 1322(b)(2)'s legislative history is appropriate. For example,
in In re Schum6 9 the court held that a court should accept an interpre-

tation taken from the legislative history that is different from that
drawn from the face of the statute only if the evidence from the legislative history is very strong. This test usually requires explicit language
in the legislative history. 0 Despite the apparent strictness of this test,
the Schum court found the word "modify" in Section 1322(b)(2) ambig63.

In re Sauber, 115 Bankr. at 199.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Even the Houghland court conceded that the legislative history of Section 1322(b)(2)
indicated congressional intent to protect the mortgage lending industry. In re Houghland886 F.2d
at 1185. For cases in which this argument is made, see, for example, In re Sauber, 115 Bankr. at
199; In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. at 736; In re Russell, 93 Bankr. at 705; In re Schum, 112 Bankr. at
161-62.
67. In re Schum, 112 Bankr. at 161; In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. at 736. See generally Lindauer,
11 J. L. & Commerce at 267-71 (cited in note 34) (arguing that congressional intent to protect a
mortgagee's entire claim is reflected in Section 1322(b)(2)'s legislative history). For a thorough
discussion of Section 1322(b)(2)'s legislative history, see In re Strober, 136 Bankr. 614, 620-22
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
68. One court stated that cramdown of a residential mortgage in Chapter 13 is at odds with
the "clear intent of Congress to protect a lender's security when a lender is secured only by a
security interest in the debtor's home." In re Russell, 93 Bankr. at 706. Accord In re Sauber, 115
Bankr. at 199.
69. 112 Bankr. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
70. Id. at 161 (quoting Tulalip Tribes of Washington v. FERC, 732 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.
1984)).
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uous 71 and relied on that section's legislative
history to interpret the
72
term in a way that prohibits cramdown.
3.

Pre-Code Law Prohibited Cramdown

A third argument against cramdown addresses the issue from an
historical context. Advocates of this view argue that the Code prohibits
cramdown of residential mortgages because under its predecessor, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a Chapter 13 plan could not include claims
secured by real property. 73 This was because, although a Chapter 8 plan
could address secured claims, the statutory definition of the term
"claim" expressly excluded "claims secured by estates in real property
or chattels real. '74 Some courts have found that Congress' silence regarding whether it intended the Code's enactment to change the treatment of residential mortgages strongly suggests that it did not intend to
change the law. 75 This silence has led more than one court to conclude
that Section 1322(b)(2) continues the prohibition 76on modification of
claimholders rights that are secured by real estate.
4. Reference to Section 101(5) Rather Than Section 506(a)
to Define "Claim"
A fourth argument that opponents of residential mortgage
cramdown employ relies on the language of Section 1322(b)(2) and attempts to nail down a precise definition of the word "claim" found in
Section 1322(b)(2). Recall that Section 1322(b)(2) allows a debtor's plan
of reorganization to "modify the rights of holders of secured claims,
other than a claim secured only by . . . the debtor's principal residence. '77 Some opponents of cramdown argue that the word "claim"
should be defined by Section 101(5)78 rather than by Section 506(a). 79
71. The Schum court found ambiguity in the word "modify" since Section 1322(b)(5) permits a debtor to cure a default or decelerate a note even though these actions technically modify
the rights of holders of secured claims. In re Schum, 112 Bankr. at 161.
72. Id. But compare In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 181-82.
73. In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. at 202. Accord In re Mitchell, 125 Bankr. at 8.
74. In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. at 202-03. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 §§ 1006(2),
1046(1). The current definition of "claim" is much broader and includes any right to payment
without regard to how or if the claim is secured. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988).
75. The legislative history of Section 1322(b)(2) does not specify whether Congress intended
the Code to change the treatment of residential mortgages. Nor does Congress address this issue
elsewhere in the Code. For courts finding this silence meaningful, see In re Kaczmarczyk, 107
Bankr. at 202. Accord In re Mitchell, 125 Bankr. at 8.
76. In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. at 203; In re Mitchell, 125 Bankr. at 8. But note that
Congress did change the law regarding the definition of "claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988). See also
note 177.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
78. Pub. L. 101-647 (1990) redesignated Section 101(4) as Section 101(5).
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The difference is that Section 101(5) defines "claim" without reference
to security or lack of security, and, therefore, refers to the entire claim
in the context of a Section 1322(b)(2) cramdown. Advocates of using
Section 101(5) to define the meaning of "claim" within Section
1322(b)(2) point out that the definition of a term in the definitional
section of a statute should control the construction of that term wherever it appears throughout the statute."s On the other hand, proponents
of cramdown argue that the phrase "secured claims" immediately
before the phrase "other than" requires reference to Section 506(a) to
define "secured claims" and limits the word "claim" to only the secured
portion of the claim as determined by Section 506(a). s '
5.

"The Rights of Holders of Secured Claims" is the Subject of
Section 1322(b)(2)'s "Other Than" Clause

A fifth argument that opponents of cramdown employ notes that
cramdown utilizes an interpretative scheme that renders the words "secured claims" the subject of Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause.
Although proponents of cramdown concede that the "other than"
clause prohibits modification, they contend that this prohibition only
extends to a claim's secured portion because they assume that the subject of Section 1322(b)(2) is "secured claims." Opponents of cramdown
directly challenge this assumption by contending that the true subject
of Section 1322(b)(2)'s anti-modification clause is not "secured claims"
but rather "the rights" of those holding secured claims.82 If "the rights"
of those holding secured claims is the subject of Section 1322(b)(2),
then it is those rights, and not merely the secured claim, that may not
be modified. Once it is established that "the rights" and not "secured
claims" are the subject of Section 1322(b)(2)'s no-modification clause, it
follows easily that cramdown of residential mortgages modifies these
"rights" and, therefore, violates Section 1322(b)(2)'s prohibition against
modification. 83

79. In re Etchin, 128 Bankr. at 668; In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. at 202; In re Russell, 93
Bankr. at 705.
80. This is an elementary principle of statutory construction. See In re Etchin, 128 Bankr. at
668.
81. In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 180-81 (citing In re Hart, 923 F.2d at 1413).
82. Id. at 667-78. Accord In re Lee, 137 Bankr. at 287; In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 488.
83. In re Etchin, 128 Bankr. at 668.
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Appreciation in the Value of Collateral Should Accrue to the
Creditor and not the Debtor

The court in In re Etchin made a rather unique argument against
cramdown 4 The Etchin court prohibited cramdown after concluding
that cramdown would deprive the creditor of the right to appreciation
in the value of the collateral,5 implying that this right belonged to the
8
creditor and not the debtor.
The court began by comparing the Code's treatment of debtors filing under Chapter 13 with debtors that file under other chapters in the
Code.8 The court noted that many creditor protection provisions found
elsewhere in the Code are absent in Chapter 13 because Congress
designed Chapter 13 to offer simplified and expedited relief to consumers and other small debtors.8 Noticeably absent in Chapter 13 is a
counterpart to Section 1111(b), a section that provides for the protection of undersecured creditors by giving them the right to any appreciation in the value of their collateral up to the full amount of their
claim. 8 Under Section 1111(b), creditors may elect to have the debt
owed to them become secured to the full amount of the debt, rather
than being secured only up to the value of their collateral,8 9 even if the
value of the collateral at the time of the election is substantially less
than the amount of the debt.9 0 By so electing, any appreciation up to
the amount of the debt accrues to the creditor and not the debtor.9 1
These rights and others 92 effectively protect secured creditors from a
forced cramdown in Chapter 11.'
The Etchin court noted that the need for creditor protection in
Chapter 13 is far less compelling than in Chapter 11.14 This is because
loans to Chapter 13 debtors, except for residential mortgages, are typically secured by rapidly depreciating personal property and are made in
a highly competitive consumer finance market.9 5 The less compelling
need for creditor protection in Chapter 13 supports a rule that gener84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Jefferey A. Stein, Section 1111(b): Providing Undersecured Creditors with Post-Confirmation Appreciation in the Value of the Collateral, 56 Am. Bankr. L. J. 195, 195 (1982).
90. In re Etchin, 128 Bankr. at 666.
91. Id.
92. Chapter 11 creditors are also given the right to "credit bid" if there is a sale of the
collateral during the case's administration. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (1988).
93. In re Etchin, 128 Bankr. at 667.
94. Id. at 687.
95. Id.
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ally allows cramdown in Chapter 13 cases. However, the fact that Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause is an exception to the general rule
of Section 1322(b)(2) supports a rule prohibiting cramdown of residential mortgages. Thus, the Etchin court found that Section 1322(b)(2)'s
narrowly drawn exception from modification for home mortgages is consistent with a specific need for creditor protection. Therefore, courts
should not diminish the exception's effect by attempting to protect a
debtor's "fresh start" through an overly technical reading of the Code. 6
III.

DEWSNUP AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CRAMDOWN DEBATE

In Dewsnup, the Supreme Court held that Chapter 7 debtors cannot stripdown residential mortgages.97 The precise issue in Dewsnup
differs from the cramdown issue in two important ways. First, Dewsnup
was a Chapter 7 case, and Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 at times promote
different goals. 8 Second, the debtor in Dewsnup attempted to reduce
his mortgage obligation under Section 506(d) rather than Section
1322(b)(2). Therefore, the Dewsnup holding is not readily applicable to
the Chapter 13 cramdown debate. Furthermore, the court in Dewsnup
made a valiant effort to limit its holding to the specific facts of the
case.9 9 Nevertheless, much of the Supreme Court's reasoning is applicable to Chapter 13. The following section discusses how Dewsnup has
impacted the Chapter 13 cramdown debate.
A.

The Supreme Court's Decision in Dewsnup

In Dewsnup, 0 0 the Supreme Court had to decide whether a Chapter 7 debtor could bifurcate an undersecured lien on real property and
96. Id.
97. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
98. There is at least one reason why a holding in a Chapter 7 case such as Dewsnup may not
be applicable under Chapter 13. Under Chapter 7, a trustee collects the debtor's non-exempt assets, sells them, and distributes the proceeds to creditors in proportion to their claims. Under
Chapter 13, however, the debtor generally does not liquidate his assets but pays his creditors
through his future earnings over the next three or five- years. Because creditors are paid more
gradually under Chapter 13 than under Chapter 7, the debtor's successful rehabilitation is arguably more important under Chapter 13 than under Chapter 7.
99. 112 S. Ct. at 778 & n.3. The court stated:
Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argument illustrate
the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply to all possible
fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their
legal resolution on another day.
Id. at 778. It is likely that despite the Court's attempts, its decision will have significant effects in a
broad range of issues.
100. Id. at 773.
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then avoid the unsecured portion of the claim under Section 506(d). 101
The debtor, relying on Section 506(a), argued that the creditor had an
"allowed secured claim" for purposes of Section 506(d) only to the extent that the claim was secured. 102
The bankruptcy court was not convinced by this argument and did
not allow stripdown. 103 The court first accepted the assumption that the
property securing the lien was abandoned by the trustee pursuant to
Section 554.10" Because the debtor's estate no longer held an interest in
the abandoned property, the court disallowed the debtor's use of Section 506(a) to define terms in Section 506(d) since Section 506(a) does
not apply to property in which the debtor's estate has no interest. 105
Before the Supreme Court, the creditor 06 argued that "allowed secured claim" in Section 506(d) is not an indivisible term of art defined
by Section 506(a), but rather creates a two-pronged test for lien avoidance. 107 According to the creditor, a claim first must be allowed under
Section 502, and second, secured, to escape avoidance under Section
506(d).' Since it was clear on the facts of the case that the claim was
both allowed and at least partially secured, the creditor argued that
stripdown was inappropriate.10 9 The creditor also noted that pre-Code
bankruptcy law preserved such liens and that nothing in the Code's legislative history reflects an intent to alter the law. 110
The Supreme Court held that, on the facts of the case, Section
506(d) does not permit stripdown because the claim was both allowed
and secured."' The Court also stated that it was not convinced Congress intended a departure from pre-Code law that allowed liens to pass
101. Id. Generally, Section 506(d) voids every lien to the extent that it secures a claim
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim.
102. 112 S. Ct. at 776-77.
103. In re Dewsnup, 87 Bankr. 676 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988). See also note 20.
104. Id. Section 554 authorizes the court to authorize the trustee to abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate. Although the trustee in
Dewsnup never actually abandoned the property, the court appropriately treated the property as if
it had been abandoned since the property was of no value to the estate. A bankruptcy estate is
created for the benefit of unsecured creditors upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 111 U.S.C. §
541(a) (1988). The property at issue in Dewsnup was of no benefit to the estate (i.e., unsecured
creditors) because the amount of liens on the property exceeded its value.
105. Id. The district court affirmed without opinion. The Tenth Circuit also affirmed. In re
Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990).
106. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 777. The creditor was joined by the United States as amicus
curiae.
107. Id.
108. Id. This is because Section 506(d) is phrased in the negative.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 778.
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through bankruptcy unaffected."' The Court, however, was careful to
limit its decision to the facts before it. 113
The Court was comforted in its decision because, unlike the
debtor's interpretation, its interpretation resulted in a rule under which
any appreciation in the collateral's value during bankruptcy accrues to
the benefit of the secured creditor, rather than the debtor or other unsecured creditors." 4 The Court noted that this result was consistent
with what the creditor would have received had it not participated in
bankruptcy: in rem property rights in the collateral along with the attendant rights to appreciation, up to the full value of his claim, in that
property." 5
B.

Analysis of Residential Cramdown Since Dewsnup

The first major case interpreting Dewsnup's impact on the residential cramdown debate was the Second Circuit's decision in In re Bellamy." 6' In Bellamy, the Second Circuit permitted the debtor to
that
cramdown the mortgage on their principal residence and concluded
7
"inapposite.""
was
506(d)
Section
of
analysis
Dewsnup's
The court began by stating that Congress was aware of debtors'
difficulties in avoiding liquidation when it enacted the claim-splitting
provision, Section 506(a)." 8s The Bellamy court thus felt that Congress
intended Section 506(a) to allow debtors to keep their homes." 9 The
Bellamy court then employed the analysis pro-bifurcation courts typically use: an allowed claim secured by a lien is a secured claim only to
the extent of the value of the collateral, 2 0 and Section 1322(b)(2) pro112. Id.
113. Id. at 778 & n.3.
114. Id. at 778.
115. Id. The dissent felt that the case turned on the definition of the phrase "allowed secured
claim" in Section 506(d), and turned to Section 506(a) to define "allowed secured claim." The
dissent argued that its interpretation was consistent with a "clear and unmistakable" pattern of
usage: elsewhere in the Code the phrase "allowed secured claim" refers to only the secured portion
of the claim as defined by Section 506(a), but when the Code refers to the entire claim it uses the
words "allowed claim." Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 777 (Scalia dissenting).
Scalia's dissent condemns the majority's "one-subsection-at-a-time" interpretative approach
because it violates the normal rule of statutory construction which holds that identical words used
in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. Scalia also found the
majority's reliance on pre-Code law inappropriate when dealing with contradictory statutory text.
Id. (Scalia dissenting).
116. 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 183.
118. Id. at 177-78.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 178-79.
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hibits modification of only the "secured claim" as determined by Section 506(a). 121
The lender, however, argued that the court need not consult Section 506(a) before applying Section 1322(b)(2)'s prohibition on modification because Section 506(a) deals with whether a claim is secured
rather than purporting to affect a creditor's rights. 22 The Bellamy
court, however, framed the issue in terms of whether Section
1322(b)(2)'s prohibition on modification extends to the entire claim or
merely to the secured portion. 12 3 The court's decision that the prohibi-

tion extends only to the secured portion resulted from its finding that
the Code made a fundamental change in pre-Code law: treatment under
the Code turns on whether a claim is secured rather than whether the
creditor is secured. 124 The court held that bifurcation of a claim into a
claim does not modify but rather detersecured claim and an unsecured
25
mines a creditor's rights.

The court rejected the lender's argument that Section 101(5) defines "claim" as the entire claim and that the "other than" clause prohibits modification of the entire claim.'26 Although the court found that
the "other than" clause refers to "secured claim," the court felt bound
27
to construe Code provisions so as to avoid conflict whenever possible.
The court thus held that Section 506(a) rather than Section 101(5) defines "secured claim" within Section 1322(b)(2)." 2
An examination of Section 1322(b)(2)'s legislative history also did
not lend support to the creditor's argument. 129 Although the court acknowledged that the legislative history demonstrated Congress' intent
to give greater protection to home mortgage lenders than to other secured lenders, the court felt that it could not determine to what extent
121.

Id.

122. Id. at 179.
123. Id. Compare In re Hart, 923 F.2d at 1410, which framed the issue as whether Section
1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause prohibits bifurcation so as to leave the unsecured portion of the
claim unprotected.
124. 962 F.2d at 179.
125. The court stated that "bifurcating [the lender's] claim into unsecured and secured portions does not, for purposes of § 1322(b)(2), modify its "rights," but rather simply determines how,
under the Code, its right to payment must be satisfied." Id. at 180. See also In re Hart,923 F.2d at
1413 (stating that bifurcation is a recognition of the legal status of a creditor's interest in the
debtor's property and not a modification of the mortgage); Laurence P. King, ed., 3 Collier on
Bankruptcy § 506.04[1] at 506-15 (stating that Section 506(a) provides a measure of the entitlements of holders of secured claims).
126. In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 180.
127. Id. (citing Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S.
490, 510 (1989)). See also United Savings Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
128. In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 180.
129. Id. at 181-82.
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Congress intended this greater protection.13 0 Since the legislative history did not expressly state that the intended protection extended to
does not conflict
the entire claim, the court concluded that cramdown
3
history.'1
legislative
1322(b)(2)'s
with Section
The court interpreted Dewsnup as preventing it from presuming
that the meaning of "secured claim" in Section 1322(b)(2) was the same
as in Section 506(a). 3 2 But Dewsnup did not control the definition of
"secured claim" under Section 1322(b)(2). 3 3 The court felt it reasonaunless doing
ble to assume that Section 506(a) defines "secured claim"
34
so would be contrary to basic bankruptcy principles.
35
the Fifth Circuit recently held that bifurcaIn In re Nobleman,1
tion of a lien secured only by the debtor's principle residence violates
Section 1322(b)(2). In Nobleman, the creditor objected to the debtor's
proposed plan to bifurcate a mortgage into secured and unsecured portions. 13 6 The creditor argued that bifurcation resulted in an impermissible modification of the creditor's rights that are protected under
Section 1322(b)(2). The creditor bolstered its argument by pointing out
that the general language of Section 506(a) should not prevail over the
specific language of Section 1322(b)(2). Further, the creditor suggested
that bifurcation frustrates Congress' intended protection of the mortgage lending industry-an industry that Congress has recognized as
serving a valuable social function.13 7 The creditor's amici argued further
that bifurcation provides a windfall to the debtor and that3 cramdown's
8
supposed promotion of the debtor's fresh start is illusory.1
The court noted two contradictory lines of cases, one favoring the
debtor's position and the other the creditor's.13 9 Stating that Dewsnup
lent support to its decision, the court eventually ruled that Section
1322(b)(2) prohibits cramdown.140 The court relied on language in Dewsnup that Congress would not create a broad new remedy without men130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 182.
133. Id. at 130.
134. Id. (citing Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779). The court did not find that using Section 506(a)
to define "secured claim" in Section 1322(b)(2) was contrary to basic bankruptcy principles.
135. 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
136. Id. at 485-86.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 486. For cases holding that bifurcation and cramdown violate Section 1322(b)(2),
see In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. at 733; In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. 200 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In
re Bouillon, 123 Bankr. at 549; and In re Schum, 112 Bankr. at 159. For cases allowing bifurcation,
see In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 176; In re Hart, 923 F.2d at 1410; Wilson, 895 F.2d at 123; In re
Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1182.
140. 968 F.2d at 487.
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tioning it in the Code's text or legislative history.1 4' The court also
relied on language in Dewsnup to hold that a creditor's lien stays with
the real property, that this was what the parties bargained for, and that
the lienholder should receive any benefit from appreciation in the value
2
of the collateral.'
Relying on its own independent analysis, the Fifth Circuit held
that the plain meaning of Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits cramdown. 1 43
Further, the Fifth Circuit found that the specific language of Section
1322(b)(2) prevails over the general language of Section 506(a). The two
sections conflict and a specific provision must take precedence over general language when two Code provisions conflict.'" Additionally, the
court endorsed the argument that the subject of Section 1322(b)(2) are
the rights of the holders of the secured claims and not the claims themselves.' 45 Finally, the court concluded after examining the legislative
history of Section 1322(b)(2), that Congress intended to prohibit
46
cramdown.'
A court that took a rather novel approach to the cramdown debate
is the Arizona bankruptcy court in In re Dyer.147 The Dyer court held
that, although Section 1322(b)(2) does not prohibit bifurcation, a
debtor's inability to discharge the in rem liability aspect of a lien pre48
vents cramdown.'
The court, bound by the Ninth Circuit's pre-Dewsnup decision in
Houghland, 49 framed the issue as whether Dewsnup prohibits bifurcation and avoidance of a lien encumbering the debtor's principal residence. 50 The court began by examining the Supreme Court's decision
in Johnson v. Home State Bank,'5 1 which held that even though a
Chapter 7 discharge may remove a debtor's personal liability, in rem
liability survives bankruptcy and may be paid under a Chapter 13
plan.'5 ' The Dyer court interpreted Dewsnup as a logical extension of
the principle set forth in Johnson that in rem, or nonrecourse, claims
survive at the end of bankruptcy. 153
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 487-88.
144. Id. at 488.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 488-89. For an excellent discussion of Section 1322(b)(2)'s legislative history, see
In re Strober, 136 Bankr. 614, 620-22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
147. 142 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).
148. Id. at 373-74.
149. In re Houghland, 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
150. In re Dyer, 142 Bankr. at 366.
151. 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
152. In re Dyer, 142 Bankr. at 366-68.
153. Id. at 368.
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The Dyer court identified three approaches that had evolved in the
lower courts after Dewsnup.15 4 "The first approach permits bifurcation
of a creditor's claim into a secured and unsecured claims, but prohibits
the debtor from avoiding the lien if the debtor's reorganization plan
does not propose paying off the entire secured claim.' 1 55 The second

approach strictly follows Section 1322(b)(2) by prohibiting bifurcation
of the creditor's claim as well as avoidance of the creditor's lien. 156 The
third approach permits both bifurcation of the claim and avoidance of
57
the unsecured portion of the lien.1

The Dyer court chose to permit the bifurcation of the creditor's
claim into a secured claim and an unsecured claim, but to prohibit the
avoidance of the lien unless the debtor proposes to pay off the entire
secured claim in the reorganization plan.15

At the conclusion of the

payments under the plan, the debtor receives a discharge of personal
liability but not of in rem liability: any liens encumbering the debtor's
property will survive bankruptcy and will not be discharged until paid
in full. 159

This result is consistent with Dewsnup and Johnson to the extent
that these cases give the benefit of appreciation to the lienholder.160 Although the debtor may not cram down, a benefit of the Dyer approach
to debtors is that it may treat undersecured portions of claims less favorably during the life of their plans.' 6 ' The benefit of the Dyer approach to creditors is that they retain a property interest in their
collateral and may foreclose under state law if the debtor defaults.6 2
IV.

CRITIQUE, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATION

The previous two sections of this note have examined the current
state of the law. This section discusses what the law should be. It begins
by analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of both the pro-cramdown
and anti-cramdown arguments. It then attempts to reduce the controversy to the basic bankruptcy values implicated in the debate. Finally,
it fashions an original solution to the issue that respects these values by
154. Id. at 369.
155. Id. See also In re Zeigler, No. 91-126205, 91-10145, 1992 WL 50006 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1992); In re Taras, 136 Bankr. 941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).
156. See text accompanying notes 135-46. See also In re Davidoff, 136 Bankr. 567 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1992); In re Ireland, 137 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
157. In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 176.
158. In re Dyer, 142 Bankr. at 369.
159. Id. at 370.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 372.
162. Id.
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awarding to the creditor appreciation in the value of the collateral up to
the amount of the debt still owing at the end of the plan.
A.
1.

Critique

Critique of the Pro-Cramdown Interpretation

At its most basic level, the cramdown debate is merely a question
of how much of a fresh start16 a debtor should receive. In other words,
should a debtor be able to modify the rights of the lender who lent the
debtor money to purchase a home? Protecting lenders' rights makes
home mortgage lending more attractive and arguably promotes the
American dream of home ownership. On the other hand, allowing debtors to cram down their mortgages may discourage home mortgage lending and create a barrier to others seeking to own their own homes.,-6 A
pro-cramdown rule would create a barrier to home ownership because
lenders would bear the cost of the debtors' fresh start and would ultimately pass this cost on to those who borrow to purchase a home.'
One might view cramdown simply as a question of who should bear
the cost of the debtor's troubled financial condition: the debtor himself
or everyone who borrows money to purchase a home? Shifting the cost
to all borrowers spreads the cost over a large number of people and,
therefore, makes the cost any one person bears small. Except for a desire to provide a debtor with a fresh start, 66 however, no justification
exists for requiring many financially responsible borrowers to pay for
one debtor's financial irresponsibility.
Thus, whether the Code should allow cramdown, and thereby allow
debtors to shift the cost of their financial irresponsibility to financially
responsible borrowers, begs the question of why our legal system pro163. The term "fresh start" denotes the improved position of the debtor at the end of bankruptcy after the debtor's debts have been discharged. A debtor's return to productive society is

facilitated by his retention of essential assets such as a homestead, minimum furnishings, and his
tools of the trade. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988) (listing property the debtor may retain
under a Chapter 7 liquidating bankruptcy). The author of this Note uses the term "fresh start"
broadly to connote both the benefit of the discharge of indebtedness and the facilitation of the
debtor's return to productive society that the retention of certain essential assets provides.
164. See generally Michael S. Polk, The Chapter 13 Cramdown: New Nightmare for the
Lender, 19 Real Estate L. J. 279 (1991).
165. Indeed, Polk argues that an interpretation of the Code that permits cramdown may
even impact the availability of housing. Polk, 19 Real Estate L. J. at 297 (arguing that residential
lenders might be forced to dismantle low down payment loan programs if such lenders are not
completely protected by Section 1322(b)(2)).
166. See, for example, Local Loan Co. v.Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Wetmore v. Markoe,
196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (stating that "[s]ystems of bankruptcy are designed to relieve the honest
debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive and to permit him to have a
fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the obligations and responsibilities which may
have resulted from business misfortunes").
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vides debtors with a fresh start.1 7 If one sees value in providing debtors
with a fresh start, the question then becomes how extensive should the
debtor's fresh start be. 168 Either way, the pro-cramdown interpretation
offers a debtor a larger fresh start than does the anti-cramdown
interpretation.
Another benefit of cramdown is that it allows debtors to keep their
homes. Debtors often file under Chapter 13 for the principal reason of
keeping their homes. 169 This is consistent with the rehabilitative goal of
Chapter 13. Chapter 13 is designed to reorganize the debtor's debts and
pay the debts through the debtor's future earnings rather than by liquidating the debtor's assets as under Chapter 7.171 It follows, then, that
debtors filing under a reorganization chapter, such as Chapter 13,
should be able to retain their property rather than having it liquidated. 7 1 . In addition, a Chapter 13 cramdown may make Chapter 13

more attractive to debtors than Chapter 7, thus encouraging them to
reorganize instead of liquidating. This is advantageous because it is
consistent with Congress's intent to encourage debtors to reorganize
rather than liquidate.
167. The fresh start is at the heart of bankruptcy policy. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh
Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1393 (1985) (explaining that the fresh
start offers some protection from unwise credit decisions and "eliminates disincentives that cause
debtors to become less productive once a large portion of their wages begins flowing to their
creditors").
168. To the extent that this question should be answered by the legislature, it is beyond the
scope of this Note. But to the extent that the legislature has already decided the question and
expressed its answer in Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause, the question is properly addressed below.
169. Nassen, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. at 979 n.1 (cited in note 14).
170. This is evidenced by the varying titles of the chapters; Chapter 13 is entitled "Adjustment of Debts of an Individual With Regular Income," while Chapter 7 is entitled "Liquidation."
The rationale behind bankruptcy reorganizations (as in Chapter 13) as opposed to straight
liquidations (as in Chapter 7) is that the debtor's property has a greater value to the debtor as a
going concern than the value of the property if liquidated. See United States v. Whiting Pools,
Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1982). See also note 194. This attempt to maximize value was designed to
benefit both creditors and the debtor. See Harvey M. Lebowitz, Bankruptcy Deskbook 1 (Practicing Law Inst., 2d ed. 1990) (stating that bankruptcy laws were devised to relieve honest debtors of
their overwhelming debts while maximizing the amount creditors would receive on their debts).
See also H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 at 220, in 3 USCCAN at 6179 (cited in note 1) (stating that Congress, by permitting reorganization, anticipated that businesses could produce a return for debtorowners as well as continuing to provide jobs and satisfy the claims of creditors). Yet, if retention of
assets by the debtor is designed to maximize the value of the assets, and value maximization is
designed to protect creditors, then the debtor cannot justifiably exclude the creditor from the benefit of subsequent appreciation in the value of the collateral.
171. A prohibition against cramdown can be seen as a forced liquidation. If the debtor is
unable to pay the secured claim in full under the plan, then he or she will have to sell the collateral
(that is, liquidate). Cramdown increases the likelihood that the debtor will be able to pay the
secured claim in full by reducing what is considered the full claim.
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A final but dubious benefit of cramdown is a statutory interpretation scheme that results in harmony between Sections 1322(b)(2) and
506(a). It seems sensible to fashion an interpretation of the Code that
does not render the instant provision in conflict with other provisions of
the Code. 17 2 Some courts even claim that this is a general principle of
statutory construction.171 No court addressing the issue of cramdown of
residential mortgages under Chapter 13, however, has adequately explained why one should favor interpretations that avoid statutory con17 4
flict over those that expose statutory conflict.
Perhaps the rule favoring interpretations that result in statutory
harmony is built on the assumption that a code is a system of interrelated provisions designed to work together 175 and, therefore, code provisions generally do not conflict. Thus, it is logical to assume that the
legislature did not intend the instant code provision to conflict with another code provision because, as a general rule, the legislature does not
enact code provisions that conflict. The limits of this assumption are
transgressed and this rule of statutory construction rendered inapplicable when the legislature intended the instant code provision to conflict
with another code provision. This might be the case when the legislature intended the instant provision as an exception to an existing rule,
or when the instant provision is designed to deal specifically with a
matter dealt with only generally elsewhere in the code.
Not surprisingly, Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause falls
within these exceptions. Congress intended the "other than" clause as
an exception to the general rule of Section 1322(b)(2) which permits
modification of secured claims. Furthermore, it deals specifically with
the modification of certain secured claims that are dealt with in Section
506(a). Either of these two reasons alone is sufficient to upset the assumption underlying the rule preferring interpretations that avoid statutory conflict. Thus, the value of a harmonious interpretation in the
instant case is illusory.
172. Textualism, one of several schools of statutory interpretation, rejects interpretations
that render other parts of the same statute inoperative. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 661 (1990).
173. See, for example, In re Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1183 (citing Ron Pair Enterprises,489
U.S. at 1030).
174. But see In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 181 (citing Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 510 (1989)). See also United Saving Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (stating that "statutory construction is
[a] holistic endeavor," and that "apparently ambiguous language may be clarified when viewed in
[the] context of the statutory scheme as a whole").
175. Black's Law Dictionary 257 (West, 6th ed. 1990) (defining "code" as "[a] systematic
collection ... of laws").
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Whether debtors should be able to cram down the mortgages on
their principal residences should also be viewed from a legislative viewpoint. In Chapter 13, cramdown of undersecured claims is the rule, and
prohibition of cramdown is the exception. Section 1322(a) lists what a
plan must include, while Section 1322(b) lists what a plan may include.
Section 1322(b)(2) specifically allows a debtor's plan to modify the
rights of holders of secured claims other than claims secured only by
the debtor's principal residence. It is only Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other
than" clause that calls into question the legality of cramdown when the
claim is secured by the debtor's principal residence.
Perhaps, therefore, the most significant shortcoming of the procramdown argument is that it fails to give effect to Congress' intent
behind Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause. Although the extent to
which Congress intended to protect home mortgage lenders cannot be
determined easily 176 from Section 1322(b)(2)'s legislative history, it is
worth noting that even pro-cramdown courts concede that Congress intended some protection of the home mortgage lending industry. 177 Yet,
an interpretation of Section 1322 that allows cramdown of claims secured only by the debtor's principal residence fails to protect home
mortgage lenders to the extent Congress intended. This is because a
pro-cramdown interpretation of Section 1322(b)(2) offers protection
from modification to the holders of claims secured only by the debtor's
principal residence. This interpretation protects only the secured claim
and, therefore, extends only to the value of the property. This provides
little protection because the holders of claims secured by any type of
property, whether it is the debtor's principal residence or not, receive
nearly equal protection under the Code. That is, Section 1325(a)(5)(B)
protects all secured claims by requiring a debtor's plan to pay secured
creditors the present value of the creditor's claim. Thus, Section
1322(b)(2)'s approval of modification allows a debtor to do little of any
value17 s except bifurcate the claim into a secured and unsecured claim.
176. But see In re Strober, 136 Bankr. at 614 (finding that the legislative history shows
clearly congressional intent to prohibit cramdown of residential mortgages). Note that the Second
Circuit's decision in In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992), effectively overrules Strober. Regarding Section 1322(b)(2)'s legislative history, the Bellamy court held that the extent to which
mortgage lenders were to be accorded greater protection, that is, whether Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits bifurcation of residential mortgages, may not be gleaned from the legislative history. 962
F.2d at 182.
177. In re Hart, 923 F.2d at 1415.
178. Modification of secured claims allowed by Section 1322(b)(2) and not prohibited by Section 1325(a)(5)(B) is limited to changes in the timing, scheduling, or manner of payment, but may
not modify the amount of payment. See also In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 182 (citing Bankruptcy
Laws Commissions' Report, H.R. Doc. 93-137, pt.2, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. at 205 (1973).
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The debtor then can pay the unsecured claim less than its full
amount, 17 9 or modify the timing or method of payment.
As a result, many pro-cramdown courts have been the target of
80
criticism that cramdown leaves Section 1322(b)(2) without a purpose.1
They have responded by pointing to Section 1322(b)(2)'s protection of
the secured portion of the claim. 18 But a pro-cramdown interpretation
gives the words "other than" in Section 1322(b)(2) only the function of
prohibiting a debtor from modifying the timing or manner of payment
or some other right the claimholder might have. It seems implausible
that Congress would entertain testimony s concerning the dangers
cramdown poses to the home mortgage lending industry and respond
with such minimal protection. Thus, the pro-cramdown interpretation
violates the rule of statutory interpretation that mandates an interpretation that gives meaning to each word in a statute. 8 3
To review, the primary benefits of the pro-cramdown interpretation
are that it provides a debtor with a greater fresh start and facilitates
the debtor's retention of his home. The prime drawback is that the procramdown interpretation does little to effectuate Congress' intent.
2.

Critique of the Anti-Cramdown Interpretation.

The most positive result stemming from an interpretation of Section 1322(b)(2) that prohibits cramdown is that it effectuates Congressional intent. Claims secured only by the debtor's principal residence
are protected in full. This protection is significant and goes beyond the
179. The treatment of secured and unsecured claims is greatly different. Section
1325(a)(5)(B) requires that a debtor's plan pay secured claims not less than the allowed amount of
the claim, while Section 1325(a)(4) requires the plan to pay unsecured claims only "not less than
the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title."
180. In re Houghland, 886 F.2d at 128.
181. Id. In bolstering the argument that a specific provision should control a general provision, many courts note that, in the context of residential mortgage cramdown, allowing the general
provisions of Section 506(a) to prevail over Section 1322(b)(2) largely vitiates Section 1322(b)(2)'s
protection of home mortgage lenders. In re Russell, 93 Bankr. at 706; In re Mitchell, 125 Bankr. at
6. But compare Wilson, 895 F.2d at 123.
182. Edward J. Kulik, Senior Vice President of the Real Estate Division of the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., testified that the flow of funds into new residential mortgages
would be greatly reduced if the threat of bankruptcy cramdowns was not ameliorated. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Improvements of the Judiciary Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 709 (1977) (statement of Edward J. Kulik). An
excellent discussion of Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause may be found in In re Strober, 136
Bankr. at 620-22. Although the decision was effectively overruled by Bellamy, the court's discussion of Section 1322(b)(2)'s legislative history is still insightful.
183. See, for example, United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (stating that
"[iut is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute' ") (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882)). Accord Norman J. Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 46.06 at 119 (Clark, Boardman, 5th ed. 1992).
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protections offered any other type of claim, thereby furthering Congress's intent to protect the home mortgage industry.
A related benefit of an anti-cramdown interpretation is that any
appreciation in the value of the collateral during bankruptcy accrues to
the benefit of the creditor. If cramdown is permitted, the debtor would
take the property for its current value. If the value of the property later
increases, the debtor receives a windfall.184 The appreciation would accrue solely to the benefit of the debtor and the debtor would have no
obligation to repay the creditor. An anti-cramdown interpretation
largely eliminates this undesirable incentive inherent'in the cramdown
approach.
When cramdown is prohibited, one of three things might happen.
One, the creditor is paid in full under the plan and, therefore, is not
harmed. Two, the debtor surrenders the collateral to the creditor in lieu
of paying the claim under the plan. In this scenario, the creditor remains unharmed, for even though the value of the collateral may not
fully satisfy the creditor's claim and the creditor may suffer economic
loss as a result, the creditor is not harmed in a legal sense because it
receives the full benefit of its bargain. Third, the plan covers the claim
but the debtor subsequently defaults on the plan. When the creditor
eventually forecloses on the security, the creditor's recovery will be
capped18 5 at the full amount of the creditor's claim rather than the
crammed down amount of the debt. In this way, the creditor benefits
from appreciation in the value of the collateral that occurs subsequent
to the confirmation of the plan.
The anti-cramdown interpretation also has the ostensible advantage of being consistent with pre-Code law. Under pre-Code law, a
debtor's Chapter XIII plan could not deal with a claim secured only by
the debtor's principle residence because the statutory definition of
"claim" expressly excluded claims secured by real property. 8 6 Thus, an
interpretation that prohibits cramdown is consistent with the result
pre-Code law would have produced.
Whether an interpretation that produces such consistency is truly
desirable depends on whether Congress intended the Code to produce
184. The debtor benefits by the amount of appreciation. Had cramdown not been allowed,
the debtor would have been unable to realize the benefit of any appreciation to the extent that the
creditor's lien remained unpaid. Yet, the word "windfall" connotes that the debtor receives something that he should not. Those who contend that the debtor receives a windfall when he is able to
cram down feel that any subsequent appreciation in the value of the collateral should accrue to the
benefit of the creditor who has been harmed by the debtor's bankruptcy. Compare Dewsnup, 112
S. Ct. at 778.
185. The debtor receives any proceeds from a foreclosure sale that exceed the amount of the
creditor's claim. Such recovery by the debtor is rare, however.
186. In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 Bankr. at 202-03.
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the same result as pre-Code law. Some anti-cramdown courts rely on
the fact that Congress failed to mention the broad new cramdown
"remedy" in both the text of Section 1322(b)(2) and its legislative history as conclusive proof that Congress intended a result consistent with
pre-Code law. 187 Proponents of an interpretation that allows cramdown,
however, maintain that the Code made numerous and sweeping changes
from pre-Code law and that silence in the legislative history is not in
and of itself dispositive. 18 They point to specific changes made by the
Code in the instant area of the law. It changed the practice of classifying claimants or claim holders under pre-Code law to classification of
the claims themselves under the Code."8 ' Also, the Code purposely
changed the definition of "claim" to be all-encompassing. 90 For these
reasons, how Congress intended the Code to treat residential mortgages
relative to how pre-Code law treated residential mortgages is largely indeterminate and any consistency that an anti-cramdown interpretation
has with pre-Code law is of dubious value. Such consistency, therefore,
cannot be touted accurately as either a benefit or a drawback.
On the other hand, what may be touted accurately as a drawback
of the anti-cramdown interpretation is its award to the creditor of the
collateral rather than the value of the collateral. Although the anticramdown interpretation technically does not award the collateral to
the creditor, this is the practical r~sult when either the debtor is forced
to abandon the property or the creditor is forced to foreclose upon the
property. An interpretation that has both the debtor and the creditor
preferring the collateral rather than the judicially determined value of
the collateral is logically flawed."9
3.

Critique of the Dyer Compromise

Recall that the Dyer court, bound by the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Houghland, allowed the debtor to bifurcate a claim secured only by
his principle residence, but did not allow the debtor to avoid the lien
nor discharge any in rem liability. 192 This approach offers some of the
187.
188.

In re Mitchell, 125 Bankr. at 8. See also Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 773.
See, for example, In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 176.

189. Id. at 179.
190. Compare the definition under pre-Code law, Bankruptcy Act of 1898 §§ 1006(2) and
1046(1), with the Code's broad definition, found at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988).
191. Logic would dictate that both the creditor and the debtor should be indifferent to either
the collateral or its value. This phenomenon is discussed in detail in Part III.B.2.
192. In re Dyer, 142 Bankr. at 364. See also text accompanying notes 147-62. In rem liability
refers to a creditor's claim against specific property as opposed to a claim against the debtor personally. A debtor typically receives at the end of bankruptcy a discharge of all debts, but this
discharge is usually limited to a discharge of only personal liability. So although personal liability
may be extinguished, in rem liability might still exist. Generally, in rem liability can be extin-
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advantages of both the pro-cramdown and anti-cramdown interpretations. The Dyer interpretation gives the debtor a broader fresh start
than that allowed by the anti-cramdown interpretation, although not
quite as broad as the pro-cramdown interpretation. Debtors are able to
cram down personal liability on their homes under the Dyer interpretation, but may not cram down their in rem liability. Thus, during the
plan, creditors may not seek satisfaction of their debts from debtors
except to the extent that the plan provides. As a result, debtors will
likely be able to keep their homes by making payments under the plan.
However, the creditor's full claim is protected because the lien on the
property is never reduced. That is, should the debtor sell the property,
the creditor must be paid the full amount of his claim. In this way, the
creditor retains the right to appreciation in the value of the collateral.
The Dyer rule, thus, expands debtors' fresh starts and ability to retain
their homes without allowing debtors to profit unjustly from an upturn
in the value of the collateral.
A weakness of the Dyer interpretation is that it does not effectuate
Congress' intent. It allows bifurcation even though Congress intended
to protect the rights of home mortgage lenders from modification. The
lender's rights are harmed because its right to satisfaction from the
debtor personally is crammed down, even though its right to satisfaction from its collateral is not. Further, it treats the symptoms of the
problem rather than its cause. The following section attempts to explain the bankruptcy values that actually cause the cramdown problem.
B.
1.

Analysis

Bankruptcy Values That Underlie the Cramdown Debate

The question whether the Code permits cramdown of mortgages secured only by the debtor's principal residence exists because a number
of important judicial values are implicated in the debate. One of these
values is the debtor's fresh start. A major purpose of bankruptcy is to
give debtors relief from their creditors. 193 Society has an interest in rehabilitating its citizens so that they may once again be productive
members of society. Bankruptcy gives debtors a fresh start and relieves
guished only by paying the entire debt. Thus, a bankruptcy discharge will not prevent the debtor
from bringing an action in rem or against a specific piece of property; but the recovery of a creditor limited to an action in rem is limited to the value of the thing he brings the action against. See
generally George M. Treister, et al., Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law 295 (ALI, 1986) (stating
that "[a] lien on the estate's property is not affected by a discharge of the underlying obligation
that it secures, although any unsecured deficiency would be barred").
193. See Lebowitz, Bankruptcy Deskbook at 1 (cited in note 170) (stating that the fresh start
was designed to allow debtors to return to their place as productive members of society). See
generally Jackson, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393 (cited in note 167).
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them considerably of financial burden by discharging much of their
debt. The real concern here is how large the debtor's fresh start should
be and who should pay for it.
A debtor's rehabilitation arguably should be facilitated by the retention of the debtor's home under a reorganization chapter such as
Chapter 13 for two reasons. First, society has an interest in encouraging
debtors to reorganize rather than liquidate because the debtor's property has a greater value in the debtor's hands than it does when it is
sold to third persons. 9 Second, mandating Chapter 13 for consumer
debtors is not likely to work because the success of a Chapter 13 reorganization is inversely related to the extent that the debtor is forced to
work for the benefit of his creditors.195
That the debtor's assets have a greater value to the debtor than to
third persons upon liquidation is one of the major underlying premises
of Chapter 13 reorganization. This premise is similar to that found in a
Chapter 11 reorganization, most often used by businesses, which holds
that business assets have a greater value when they are retained by the
debtor business as a going concern than if those assets were liquidated. 198 Cramdown is consistent with this premise in that cramdown
facilitates a debtor's ability to retain his or her home, and the debtor's
home is likely significantly more valuable to the debtor than to a
stranger.
Others, however, would argue that even though reorganization
chapters are premised upon maximizing the value of the debtor's assets
by keeping those assets in the hands of a debtor who remains a going
concern, this value maximization was intended to benefit creditors
rather than the debtors. This is a convincing argument because it is the
creditors who are harmed by the debtor's bankruptcy. Debtors should
be content with the sufficiently large discharge they receive under
Chapter 7. Such arguments suggest that cramdown is inconsistent with
what is arguably the goal of Chapter 13 reorganization: increasing the
19 7
amount that creditors receive.
A second reason why a debtor's fresh start should be generously
construed under Chapter 13 is that the courts and the Code exhibit
reluctance to force debtors to work for the benefit of their creditors.
194. See Fortgang and Mayer, 32 UCLA L. Rev. at 1065 n.16 (cited in note 13).
195. See Margaret Howard, A Theory of DischargeIn Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 Ohio St. L.
J. 1047, 1084 n.251, 1085 & n.259 (1987).
196. Id. See also note 152. But see Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 9
Bankr. Dev. J. 319, 322 (1991) (arguing that creditors receive less under Chapter 11 than under
Chapter 7, despite conventional wisdom).
197. Compare Chapter 7, where stripdown is not allowed. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773
(1992). Also, Section 1325(a)(4) expressly requires debtors to pay unsecured claims as much in
Chapter 13 as they would in Chapter 7.
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Recall that, under Chapter 13, debtors pay their debts through their
future income rather than by liquidating their assets.198 Further, debtors are often required to devote all of their disposable income to their
plan for up to five years following its confirmation. 19 It can be argued
that the likelihood of a successful reorganization, success being defined
as the debtor becoming a productive and financially responsible member of society, is inversely proportional to the degree the debtor's plan
is burdensome, for debtors have little incentive to work hard if the
fruits of their labors are to be enjoyed by their creditors rather than
themselves.
Another important concern underlying the cramdown debate is to
whom any appreciation in the value of collateral should accrue. The
right to subsequent appreciation in the value of the collateral is significant in Chapter 13 cases for two reasons. First, Chapter 13 cases usually
last from three to five years, 00 and the value of the collateral may fluctuate during this time. Second, a Chapter 13 debtor's estate is often
dominated by a single piece of real estate,20 ' and real estate is a commodity subject to routine price fluctuations. The subject of subsequent
appreciation in the value of the collateral is presented rarely as an issue
but rather as a reason to prohibit cramdown.20 The reason is that the
debtor receives a windfall if he or she is able to garner all of the benefits of appreciation in the value of the collateral by cramming down the
creditor's interest in the collateral.203 Opponents of cramdown contend
that the creditor has a right to any appreciation in the value of the
collateral up to the full amount of the creditor's claim.2 04
This leads to what is perhaps the most significant concern underlying the cramdown debate: the proper valuation of collateral. If the collateral could be valued properly, that is, assigned a value that reflects
the likelihood and magnitude of any subsequent appreciation, then the
debtor and creditor would be economically indifferent to cramdown.
This indifference is an equilibrium point at which neither the debtor
nor the creditor have incentives to liquidate the debtor's assets. This
198. What might seem an exception to this rule is the liquidation of assets encumbered by
liens. But here the debtor truly "owns" only the unencumbered portion of the asset.
199. A court may not approve a debtor's plan over the objection of an unsecured creditor
unless the debtor devotes all of his disposable income received over the next three years to the
plan/li U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (1988). Further, a court may approve a plan of up to five years in
length. Id. § 1322(c).
200. Id. § 1322(c).
201. Section 109(e) limits those who may be a debtor under Chapter 13 to an individual or
an individual and his spouse whose aggregate, noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts are less
than $350,000. For this reason, a single piece of real estate often dominates the debtor's estate.
202. See notes 84-96.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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effectuates Chapter 13's goal of reorganization since the assets have a
greater value to the debtor and to society in the debtor's hands.
2.

Valuation of Collateral and Its Role in the Cramdown Debate

The root cause of the cramdown problem is misvaluation of the
debtor's collateral. To illustrate this, consider the following hypothetical. A debtor purchases a home worth 4x by using lx of the debtor's
own money and by borrowing 3x from a creditor. The value of the property later falls to 2x. If the debtor files bankruptcy and crams down the
mortgage, the creditor's original claim of 3x will be bifurcated into a
secured claim of 2x and an unsecured claim of lx. If the true economic
value of the home were 2x, the creditor would be willing to accept 2x
dollars plus a pro rata share of lx in satisfaction of its entire claim,
because this is equal to or more than what it could realize by foreclosing on the home.2 05 If the judicially determined value of the property,
2x, accurately reflects the property's value, a creditor should be indifferent to foreclosing on the property or having its claim crammed down
to the value of the property in bankruptcy. The fact that creditors routinely oppose cramdown is evidence that property is often valued
improperly.
Proponents of cramdown might attempt to explain why creditors
oppose cramdown by contending that the creditor, by opposing
cramdown, retains an interest in the debtor's property and is able to
benefit at the expense of the debtor from any increase in value of the
property. The creditor is theoretically just as likely to benefit from subsequent appreciation in the property as it is to be harmed by subsequent depreciation in the property. Thus, the explanation is fallacious
and does not explain why a creditor prefers the return of the collateral
rather than the judicially determined value of the collateral.
Nor can opposition to cramdown that manifests itself as advocacy
of the anti-cramdown approach be explained as opportunism on the
part of the creditor. That is, a creditor might advocate an anticramdown rule in order to receive 100% of its 3x claim rather than the
cramdown result: 100% of the current value, 2x, plus a fraction of lx.
However, mere opportunism on the part of the creditor can be defeated
easily by the debtor simply by surrendering the collateral and paying a
fraction of the remaining lx. Thus, mere opportunism on the part of
creditors does not satisfactorily explain why creditors oppose
cramdown.
205. If the creditor forecloses, it will receive the home worth 2x and an unsecured claim of
lx. The creditor's act of foreclosure effectively converts its lx claim from secured to unsecured
status: the claim cannot be secured if no security exists any longer.
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Similarly, a creditor's preference for a return of the collateral
rather than the' judicially determined value of the collateral cannot be
explained as an attempt to avoid the risk of depreciation in the value of
the collateral, that is, a desire to cash out its position, since the risk of
depreciation should be accounted for in the value of the collateral. Further, any increased risk due to the fact that the debtor is a poor credit
risk is a risk that was assumed by the creditor when the credit was
originally extended. 0
The elimination of all other rational explanations leads to the conclusion that creditors do not believe that the judicially determined
value of the collateral equals its true economic value. If they did, creditors would be indifferent between a return of the collateral and its judicially determined value. Additionally, the debtor would be willing to
pay the current value of the property in a lump sum for some other
equivalent house. The reason why neither the debtor's nor the creditor's actions are consistent with the judicially determined value of the
collateral can only be that the judicially determined value understates
the true value of the property by the amount that the property is expected to appreciate.
The valuation offered to bankruptcy courts is usually supplied by
an appraiser. The flaw in this valuation is that the appraisal is based on
the supply and demand mechanics of the real estate market. In the single family real estate market, the overwhelming majority of people demanding the commodity view real estate as a consumer good and not an
investment. That is, they intend to live in the house and do not expect
to sell it within three to five years. Because these consumers do not
intend to sell the house, expected appreciation is largely irrelevant to
these purchasers, and they do not account for it when they bid for the
property. As a result, the price they are willing to pay for a home is
understated by the value of any expected appreciation. In this way, the
real estate market is imperfect and does not properly value its goods. It
follows that an appraisal of property based on the real estate market is
likewise imperfect.2 07 The solution, for bankruptcy purposes, is to include the value of expected appreciation as an element of the valuation.
206. If the creditor assumed the risk when the original credit decision was made, then the
fact of the debtor's filing bankruptcy changes nothing in the eyes of the creditor. The situation is
analagous to a sunk cost. The creditor, when making the lending decision, paid for the opportuntity to make a profit with the chance of sustaining a loss.
207. Section 506 requires valuation in light of purpose and the proposed disposition or use of
such property. The value the real estate market places on property is similar to a liquidation value,
while the true economic value includes a component that accounts for expected future appreciation
and is more closely related to a "going concern" value; that is, the property is not intended to be
liquidated but retained and should be valued in light of this purpose.
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C. A New Solution to the Cramdown Debate
1. A Prototype Solution
Recall the previous example in which the debtor used lx of its own
money and borrowed 3x to purchase a home worth 4x that subsequently
fell in value to 2x. Because the debt of 3x is secured by the debtor's
principal residence, the debtor may not modify the rights of the creditor if cramdown is prohibited. In jurisdictions where cramdown is prohibited, the debtor has the option of returning the house to the creditor
and treating the remaining lx debt under his Chapter 13 plan as an
unsecured debt, or paying the full amount of his mortgage under the
Chapter 13 plan. Because the value of the property has fallen significantly, the debtor will do better by returning the collateral to the
debtor. The result is that the debtor is homeless and the creditor has
been forced to accept the cramdown result: the value of the collateral
plus a pro rata share for the difference. The creditor finds himself
locked out of the possible future appreciation that he bargained for.
This is because, although the creditor winds up with the property, the
property has a greater value in the hands of a debtor that is a going
concern. Further, the creditor is in the business of extending credit and
not owning homes and is thus ill equipped to realize the appreciation in
the property. If cramdown were allowed, the result would be the same
except that the debtor would retain the house by buying it himself. By
doing so, the debtor would garner any future appreciation for himself
while simultaneously depriving the creditor of any future appreciation.
Assume now, however, that bifurcation and cramdown were allowed
but that the court places a value on the property of 2x + y, where y is
some amount equal to the expected value of future appreciation. In this
situation, the creditor should be indifferent between receiving either a
return of the collateral (worth 2x) plus a pro rata share of lx, or receiving payments under the plan of 2x + y plus a pro rata share of lx - y.208
The reason for the indifference is that the creditor is being paid y, the
expected value of future appreciation. The debtor is also indifferent between alternatives. Instead of having to give up the house worth 2x plus
paying a pro rata share of lx, the debtor keeps the house worth 2x and
pays a pro rata share of only (lx - y) by paying the creditor 2x + y
under the plan. The advantage of using a valuation that accounts for
the expected value of future appreciation is that both parties are indifferent to reorganization with retention of the collateral and foreclosure
208. A return of the collateral would still be mathematically larger than receiving payments
under the plan where unsecured creditors receive less than 100% of their claim. Compare 2x + pro
rata (lx) with 2x + y + pro rata (lx - y). A return of the collateral is greater by the amount y
exceeds a pro rata share of y.
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with return of collateral, so that both will agree to a reorganization.
This is advantageous because the debtor keeps the house and the house
has a greater value in the hands of the reorganized debtor.
The one flaw in this solution is the difficulty in determining the
value of y, the expected value of future appreciation. To determine y,
one must be able to predict both the probability and magnitude of future appreciation. This is prohibitively difficult. 0 9 Nevertheless, an
equivalent result may be achieved.
2.

The Revaluation Solution

A result equivalent to the prototype solution may be achieved by
first bifurcating the undersecured creditor's claim of 3x into a secured
claim of 2x and an undersecured claim of lx. Bifurcation is necessary
here to set a payment amount under the plan.2

10

The claims are paid

under the plan, and at the conclusion of the plan some three to five
years later, the collateral is revalued. If the property has appreciated,
this appreciation should accrue to the benefit of the creditor to the extent that its claim has not been fully satisfied under the plan.211 That
is, to receive a discharge, the debtor must pay the lesser of the full
amount of the secured claim or the appreciated value of the collateral
plus a fraction of any deficiency. This solution, the revaluation solution,
preserves the creditor's right to subsequent appreciation in the value of
the collateral by defining the secured claim as the value of the collateral
at the end of the plan. This works no real hardship to the debtor because in no case will it be required to pay more than originally contracted for and its repayment will be facilitated by the appreciation of
2 12
the property. 1
209. If it were possible, the lender would have used this figure when making the original
lending decision, would not have lent more than this amount, and would not have wound up
undersecured.
210.. Unlike the Dyer approach, bifurcation under this proposed new solution does not result
in a cramdown of personal liability because the amount of the secured claim will be revalued prior
to discharge.
211. The converse of this should also be true. If the property has depreciated for reasons
other than the debtor's bad faith or waste, then the creditor's original secured claim of 2x should
be reduced by the amount of this depreciation. This would require the creditor to issue the debtor
a rebate equal to the amount the secured claim was overestimated multiplied by the quantity one
minus the percentage of repayment that the creditor received on his unsecured claim. The quantity one minus the percentage of repayment on unsecured claim effectively subtracts from a 100%
recovery what would otherwise have been paid as an unsecured claim.
212. The debtor can borrow against this appreciation or sell the property to realize the appreciation. In fact, any lump sum repayment required at the end of the plan will be exactly equal
to the lesser of the appreciation in the value of the collateral over the life of the plan less the
amount paid by the debtor toward the unsecured portion of the debt, or the amount still owing on
the debt.
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This result is consistent with current law. Section 506 requires valuation in light of purpose. Dewsnup requires the secured creditor to
share in the appreciation that occurs during bankruptcy up to the full
amount of its claim. 213 The purpose of valuation under the revaluation
solution is to fix the amount of payments to the creditor under the plan
which complies with the requirements of Chapter 13 while effectuating
the reorganizational goals of Chapter 13. The purpose of the revaluation
at the conclusion of the plan is to prevent debtors from being able to
exclude the creditor from the benefit of subsequent appreciation in the
collateral. The result of the revaluation solution above complies with
the requirements of Chapter 13 by paying the creditor at least as much
as it would have received under Chapter 7214 and effectuates the goal of
reorganization by allowing debtors to keep their homes.
3.

Critique of the Revaluation Solution

The revaluation solution is superior to other interpretations of Sections 1322(b)(2) and 506(a). Its two primary advantages are that it preserves the creditor's right to appreciation while fostering the goal of
reorganization by leaving the debtor's assets in her own hands. The
anti-cramdown interpretation often forces a debtor to return the collateral because this is less expensive to the debtor than making full payments on the debt; thus the reorganizational goal of keeping the
debtor's assets in the debtor's hands is frustrated. Although the creditor gets the collateral and technically the right to its appreciation, creditors are often ill equipped to capture this appreciation. The procramdown interpretation is also inferior to the revaluation solution because, although the debtor keeps the house, the creditor is deprived of
subsequent appreciation.
The revaluation solution also effectuates the congressional intent
behind Section 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause. It does this by protecting the creditor's interest. Although the creditor's rights are modified in
a literal sense, the creditor receives as much or more from his claim
under the revaluation solution than even under a strict anti-cramdown
interpretation. This is because under the anti-cramdown interpretation,
the creditor usually receives the same amount as under the procramdown interpretation.21 5 The difference between the revaluation so213. "Any increase [in the value of the collateral] over the judicially determined valuation
during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor ... ." Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
214. Sections 1325(a)(4) and 1325(a)(5) require Chapter 13 debtors to pay their creditors at
least as much as they would have under Chapter 7.
215. If a debtor owes more on his home than its judicially determined value, the debtor likely
can purchase an equivalent home on the market for the same amount. The debtor would do this by
surrendering the home he now owns to the creditor, paying a fraction of the unsecured portion of
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lution and the anti-cramdown or pro-cramdown results is that the creditor receives the appreciation in the value of the collateral under the
revaluation solution. Under the pro-cramdown interpretation, the
debtor is able to garner any appreciation for itself. Under the antithe collateral but is not
cramdown interpretation, the creditor receives
16
able to capture the future appreciation.

The revaluation solution is very similar to the Dyer approach.
Neither interpretation allows a discharge of the in rem liability. The
payments under the plan are the same under both approaches. The sole
difference, practically speaking, is that the revaluation solution requires
the debtor to pay the creditor a lump sum equal to the value of any
appreciation 217 in the value of the collateral since the time of plan confirmation in order to receive a discharge. The Dyer interpretation, by
allowing bifurcation, results in cramdown of the debtor's personal liability. The revaluation solution, on the other hand, bifurcates only for
the purpose of determining the payments under the plan. It does not
result in a discharge of personal liability until the debtor pays the creditor the value of appreciation in the collateral because the secured claim
is revalued and redefined prior to discharge. 218 Under the Dyer approach, the debtor receives a discharge as to personal liability for the
value of appreciation and can defer paying this amount to the creditor
by not transferring the property." 9
One flaw of the revaluation solution is that if the value of the property immediately prior to discharge is still less than the original claim, a
bifurcation will result. This is a modification of the creditor's rights.
Although a technical violation of Section 1322(b)(2), it can be justified
the debt, and borrowing or renting an equivalent homestead. Since the debtor is typically better
off by returning the collateral, the debtor will return the collateral and the creditor loses secured
status. This change in status eliminates the rights the creditor enjoyed as a secured creditor. As a
result, under both the cramdown and anticramdown interpretations the creditor receives either the
house or its current value plus a pro rata share for the remainder.
216. The creditor is unable to capture the future appreciation because the creditor usually
sells the collateral immediately to convert it to cash. Creditors do this because they are not in the
business of holding on to houses but rather are in the business of extending credit.
217. If the amount of appreciation is negative, that is, the property is valued at an amount
less than the value at confirmation, then the creditor should pay the debtor a rebate.
218. Note the limit of this solution: if the value of the property at the end of the plan has
failed to recover fully, cramdown to the current (at the end of the plan) value of the collateral will
occur. But this type of cramdown will likely occur with less frequency and in lesser amounts than
cramdown under Dyer. Further, this is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Dewsnup
that the creditor is entitled to appreciation in the value of the collateral that occurs during bankruptcy. See note 213.
219. Under Dyer, the only way the creditor can collect the value of the appreciation in the
value of the collateral is to be paid on his lien on the transfer of the property. Thus, Dyer allows
the debtor to defer payment indefinitely by not transferring the property.
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by examining the congressional intent behind Section 1322(b)(2)'s nomodification clause.
When a creditor finds himself with an undersecured claim in bankruptcy, the collateral can either appreciate or depreciate. Further, these
changes in value can be caused either by market forces in general or by
unusual events, such as the construction of an interstate highway or an
airport near the property. These unusual events can either increase or
decrease the value of the collateral. If we assume that these unusual
events are favorable as often as they are unfavorable, then creditors, on
average, are neither harmed nor helped by these unusual events. What
remains is appreciation or depreciation due to general market forces.
The revaluation solution awards subsequent appreciation to the creditor but requires the creditor to reimburse the debtor for subsequent
depreciation. The revaluation solution is favorable to mortgage lenders
to the extent that the property is more likely to appreciate than it is to
depreciate.
Further, property that secures undersecured liens may be more
likely to appreciate than depreciate for a variety of reasons.2 20 This will
also deter homeowners from filing bankruptcy in an attempt to receive
a windfall by cramming down their mortgages. Thus, the revaluation
solution offers creditors greater protection from fluctuations in the
value of collateral than does any other solution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts disagree on the question of whether a Chapter 13 debtor
may cramdown liens secured only by the debtor's principal residence.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Dewsnup strongly supports an anticramdown interpretation, and an increasing number of courts are
prohibiting cramdown. Courts, however, remain split on the issue.
Both pro-cramdown and anti-cramdown interpretations of the
Code have serious drawbacks. The pro-cramdown interpretation does
too little to effectuate Congress' intended protection of home mortgage
lenders. The anti-cramdown interpretation is largely inconsistent with
the general reorganizational goal of Chapter 13 because it is more likely
to force a liquidation of the debtor's home.
The root cause of the cramdown controversy is judicial misvaluation of collateral. If the value of the collateral accurately reflects the
value of future appreciation, the creditor would be economically indifferent to cramdown. The creditor would allow the debtor to retain his
220. For example, the fact that the claim is undersecured suggests that the property has
recently fallen in value. And property that has fallen in value may be more likely to regain its
previous value.
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home, thus, furthering the reorganizational goal of Chapter 13. Since
the value of future appreciation is too difficult to predict, however,
courts should simply revalue the collateral immediately prior to discharge and adjust the amount of the secured claim accordingly. This
solution protects both the creditor's interests and the debtor's fresh
start.
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